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UNCLASSIFIED 
MEMORANDUM OF THE JOINT MISSION 
~'GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA -RWANDESE PATR·IOTIC FRONT" 
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF A NEUTRAL 
INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO RWANDA 
NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 16, 
\,1/ 
1993 RELEASED· JN·:FULL 
0. Nature and Mission of the Neutral International Force 
<NIF> 
. . :· . 
On June 11, 1993 the Government of Rwanda and the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front submitted a joint request to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations, asking him to 
establish and deploy quickly a NeutraL International Force 
CNIF> of which the United Nations would assume responsibility 
and command. 
This request and the Protocol of Agreement between 
the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Pat~iotic Front on 
the Integration of Armed Forces of the two Parties outline the 
various missions they would wish the NIF to carry out. These 
missions relate particularly to catering for the overall 
security of the country and supervising the process of the· 
formation of the National Army and National Gendarmerie 
<Article 54). 
Article 72 of the above-mentionned Protocol of 
Agreement .links the establishment of Transitional 
Institutions, namely the Broad-Based Transitional Government 
and the Transitional National Assembly as well as the process. 
of disengagement. and reintegration of Armed Forces, with a 
prior deployment of the NIF. The timetable of the·· -.. 
implementation of the Peace Agreement, which stipulates that 
Transitional Institu·tions must be put in· place within 
thirty-seven C37) days· after the signing of the Peace 
Agreement <Article 7 of the Peace Agreement)~ has not been so 
far respected because the NIF is not yet established and 
deployed. 
Considering that the two parties have entrusted t~e 
NIF with a key role in the fr4mework of the ·implementation of. 
the Peace Agreement, they decided to send a joint mission to 
appeal to the United Nations Secretary General and the 
Security Council so that a positive reply can be given as 
·quickly as possible, in the shape of a Resolution voted by the 
Security Council for the establishment and deployment of a 
Neutral Intern4tional Force to Rwanda. 
·:. A. The deployment of suoh a Force is necessary and urf:rt . 
. : · because of the following main reasons: ~
-~ 
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I- Politic41 reasons: 
1> The people of Rwanda urge that the delay in the 
timetable of the implementation of th.~ Peace Agreement be 
addressed promptly because, if it were t·o be further 
extended, that delay, especially in the establishment of 
Transitional Institutions, would make the whole Peace 
process collapse. 
2> The political good will that motivates both parties may be 
seriously undermined if Political Institutions are not put 
in place quickly. 
3) The 50,000 fighters of the two parties still in· their 
respective positions may end up violating the ceasefire 
.·because of nervousness due to their difficult living 
conditions it political decisions are not reached soon. 
II- Humanitarian reasons 
1> The return of the displaced persons in to their property 
can only take place after the disengagement of the forces 
currently deployed in war zones. The disengagement and 
mine clearing operations can only be supervised by the 
NIF; 
2) The rainy season is again about to start while the 
displaced persons are still homeless de9pite the fact that 
the two parties h4Ve already reached a Pea·ce Agreement; 
3> Those displaced persons should be resettled as quiokly as 
possible because, if they were to miss the planting season 
of September-October 1993~ there is likely to be f4mine. 
4) .The repatriation of the Rwandese Refugees who are eager to 
come back to their motherland oan only occur after the 
establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government 
.responsible for planning and carrying out that 
repatriation. The establishment of that Government.is 
closely linked·with the deployment of the NIF as seen 
above. · · 
5> The beginning of the school year in September-October, 
1993 must be effective otherwise school children living in 
the areas affected by the war will miss school for the 
fourth year in a row with a real risk for them to become 
illiterate. There is another category of school-age 
children who have not been able to start school tor three 
consecutive years. 
III- Economic reasons 
The disengagement of the Armed Forces of the two 
. parties shall allow the reopening and use of the Transit Roads 
· of the Northern Corridor CMombasa-Xampala-Kigali-Sujumburt9>, 
and thus contribute to boosting trade within the region~ 
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B- Size of the NIF 
The size (numbers> of the NIF should be determ1ned 
in relation with the following factors: 
1> The importance and complexity of the missions ascribed to 
the NIF; 
2) The hilly landscape of Rwanda whi,c.h makes mobility 
extremely difficult; 
3> The big numbers of the armies of the two parties 
Cover 50,000 troops) whose disengagement, demobilization 
and integration must be supervised; 
4) The presence of one RPF battalion in Kigali and thus the 
danger of bringing the soldiers of the two armies together 
in the Capital City while they are not yet integrated may 
jeopardize the whole peace process as.witnessed in other 
conflict regions. As a result the presence of a Neutral 
International Force with sufficient personnel in Kigali is 
appropriate. 
C- Duration of the NIF-mission in Rwanda 
months. 
The Transition period shall last "twenty-two C22> \ 
However there may be possibilities of considering 
the deployment modalities and disengagement mod4lities Cend of 
the mission> in two stages for either case. 
1> Deployment 
In order to avoid further delay in the establishment·. 
of Transitional Institutions 1 it is suggested to deploy as 
soon as possible the first elements of the NIF and, if 
possible, by end of September or early October, -1993. 
The other contingents would be deployed a little bit 
later in order to strengthen the first contingents and thus 
help th_em carry out all th.e missions ascribed to the NiF . 
. 2) Disengagement of the NIF 
The end of the mission of the NIF may be viewed in 
two stages; 
Great reduction of personnel may occur at the end of the 
integration process of the armed forces of the two parties 
as well as at the end of the demobilization ~rocess. 
The rest of the reduced personnel may be kept in place 







The Joint Mission Government of Rwanda Rwandese 
Patriotic Front, considering the insistent request of the 
people of Rwanda pleading for the establishment of those . 
Transitional Institutions responsible for the implementation 
of the Peace Agreement, appeals for the understanding of both 
the UN Secretary Generdl and Security Council, and submits to 




The Security Council urgently adopt a resolution 
favorable to a rapid deployment of the Neutral 
International Force in Rwanda; 
To envisage a gradual deployment of the personnel of the 
NIF whose first elements would be expected in Rwanda 
before October 10, 1993. 
As provided for in Article 53 of the Protocol of Agreement 
on the Integration of Armed Forces ot the two parties, the 
members of the Neutral Military Observer Group <NMOG> 
should be incorporated within the first elements of the 
NIF <the NMOG offers the advantage of.having one company 
currently present in Rwanda>. · 
Done in New York, September 16, 1993. 
Dr. Anaetase GASANA 
Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation 
Chairman ot the Joint 
Delegation Government of 
Patrick MAZIMHAKA 
Commissioner for· 
Externa1 Relations in RPF 
Vice-Chairman of the 
Joint Delegation 
Government of Rwanda-Rwanda-Rwandese 
Patriotic Front 'Rwande e Patriotic F~~F 
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